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We apply the information gap approach to resource allocation under Knightian (non-
probabilistic) uncertainty in order to study how best to allocate public resources between
competing defense measures. We demonstrate that when determining the level and composi-
tion of defense spending in an environment of extreme uncertainty vis-a-vis the likelihood of
armed conflict and its outcomes, robust-satisficing expected utility will usually be preferable
to expected utility maximization. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in environments with
unreliable information about threats to national security and their consequences, a desire
for robustness to model misspecification in the decision making process will imply greater
expenditure on certain types of defense measures at the expense of others. Our results also
provide a positivist explanation of how governments seem to allocate security expenditures
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“Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as
we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are
also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
Donald Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
1 Introduction
When allocating resources, policy makers, like households, face trade-offs. Many of the trade-offs
households encounter can reasonably be modeled in a deterministic setting—their incomes may
be uncertain, but when deciding between a new refrigerator or a new television set, we generally
assume that members of a household know the marginal utility they will derive from each.
By contrast, policy makers nearly always confront decisions in which the connection between
allocations, and the desirability of outcomes, are highly uncertain. No one can predict precisely
by how much a dollar transferred between different components of the public health budget will
affect an individual citizen’s longevity. Nonetheless, policy makers know a great deal about the
prevalence of infectious diseases, heart problems, and cancer in the population as a whole, and
the efficacy of different treatments for large samples of patients. Given this knowledge, decision
makers are able to derive fairly reliable probabilistic models that link different allocations of
funding with the moments of a distribution of outcomes.
Unlike public health decisions, allocating resources for national security involves decisions
where experiments are not possible (or at least unwise), and previous experience provides little
or no useful data. A policy maker whose country is threatened by a hostile neighbor may know
little about the probability distribution of possible damage or losses their country could suffer
in the event of armed conflict, or how they relate to choices between alternative allocations of
resources to different security and defense measures. Indeed, the probability that an adversary
will launch an attack may itself be unknown, but nonetheless dependent on the type of defense
capabilities our policy maker has chosen. Conditioned on an attack actually taking place,
the damages and losses the attack will cause have a distribution that is only vaguely known.
Moreover, this distribution may itself depend in a complex way on the quality of intelligence,
civil defense preparedness, and the structure, size and deployment of military forces. Similar
tradeoffs exist in allocating resources between homeland security measures and armed forces,
although the nature of the risks and their relationships to defense measures is obviously different.
When allocating resources to enhance defense and security, policy makers have to decide both
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how much to devote to defense spending, and how best to distribute that spending between a
wide range of competing options, without knowing the effects of their decisions on the ensuing
distribution of possible damages—or at best having only some qualitative knowledge about these
relationships. Experience simply does not supply enough information to accurately derive the
true probability distribution of all these different kinds of risks. Nor does it deliver a clear picture
of the relationships between different levels, and types of security expenditures, a nation may
deploy to protect itself from war and these risks probabilities and distributions. Indeed, past
history provides little guidance for predicting the losses in human life and economic disruption
that future conflicts may entail.
In this paper we demonstrate how information gap theory, a methodology designed to aid
in decision making under Knightian (non-probabilistic) uncertainty, can be usefully applied to
the question of how best to allocate resources for national defense. We focus on the example of
defense expenditures, because defense policy typically involves making hard choices, with limited
and often unreliable information, in an environment where limited resources do not permit the
unconstrained funding of all the possible measures that are available. By implementing the
info-gap methodology, policy makers combine what they know about security threats, and their
relationships to installed military capabilities, with how reliable or unreliable they suspect that
information may be. By distinguishing between these two attributes of the random nature of
threats to national security, and the effectiveness of possible countermeasures, we can separate
the implications of the underlying threats from the issue of how uncertain we are about them.
We demonstrate that when choosing the level and type of defense measures that affect secu-
rity in different ways, when probablistic information about threats is unreliable, it is better to
robust-satisfice the citizen’s expected utility rather than to attempt to maximize it.1 Moreover,
our analysis highlights one rationale for heightened spending on some types of defense measures
when there is little reliable information about the random nature of threats to national security,
thus providing a possible positivist explanation for the way governments are allocating these
expenditures today, and how they have done so in the past.
In section 2 we describe the general formulation of the info-gap methodology. In section 3 we
consider the dilemma faced by a hypothetical policy maker who must choose how much to spend
on each of two different types of military technology. The first type of expenditure involves
investment in large units employing traditional industrial-age military technology. This, the
more conservative approach, provides relatively high insurance against severe and widespread
losses. The second type of expenditure is built around the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’
1In this paper satisficing implies an allocation of defense resources which maximizes expected utility for a
satisfactory level of robustness to model misspecification.
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(RMA) doctrine, and involves a heavier reliance on precision munitions, electronic warfare, and
intelligence, as well as small, highly mobile and specially trained military units.2
Reliance on forces built to operate according to the RMA doctrine can under the most opti-
mal conditions limit the severity of casualties and other losses, but is more prone to catastrophic
failure, particularly in the event of a massive invasion by a large military force. As defense ex-
penditures are more heavily weighted towards this RMA type of expenditure at the expense
of traditional weapons systems, expected losses conditioned on suffering an attack decline, but
there is a possibly greater risk of extremely high damage. We assume throughout that the risk of
being attacked and the probability distribution of damage conditioned on an attack occurring,
are functions of both the size and structure of the military force policy makers have chosen.
We demonstrate that when policy makers must operate in an environment in which infor-
mation about the relationship between threats and different allocations for defense is unreliable,
expected utility maximization may not provide the best guidance for making decisions, because
it is completely non-robust to model misspecification. Using a hypothetical specification of se-
curity risks and the cost effectiveness of alternative defense measures, we show that the desire
of policy makers to attain some degree of robustness to model misspecification, will have pro-
found effects on both the level of resources devoted to defense, and the distribution of these
expenditures across the two possible types of defense measures.
2 Formulation
Consider a country facing various threats to its national security. These threats may take various
forms, including invasion by an aggressive neighbor or a terrorist attack. Policy makers perceive
threats to security from all sources as a bivariate distribution that includes both the event of
being attacked, and the damage the country will sustain conditional on the attack taking place.
In contrast to standard stochastic optimization problems, this distribution itself is uncertain.
Policy makers must decide what portion of the economy’s resources they will devote to countering
these risks, as well as how to allocate this expenditure between different defense measures, where
each measure has a different effect on both the risk and the potential damage from an attack.
This defense resource allocation dilemma is embedded within a standard economic framework
in which the representative risk-averse individual in this country derives utility u(c) only from
2First elaborated during the 1980’s by Soviet military theorists, in particular Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then
chief of the Soviet General Staff, the RMA doctrine of war has already had a profound effect on Western military
planning. The move to adapt the U.S. military to RMA type warfare was spearheaded by the Department of
Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and the man who has headed it since 1973, Andrew Marshall, and the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1994 to 1996, Admiral William Owens. See Eliot A. Cohen (1996).
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consumption, c. The threats considered here, and the effect of any countermeasures, affect
the resulting level of utility by their influence on the amount of resources that remains for
consumption and the degree of risk they ultimately face.
Normalizing the economy’s resources to 1, the policy maker must choose the fraction of
all resources it will devote to each of a number of different risk-mitigating expenditures χ =
(χ1, . . . , χN ). Without government debt, we require
∑N
i χi ≤ 1. Any government expenditure
detracts from the resources available for consumption, so c = 1−
∑N
i χi. On the other hand these
government expenditures reduce the fractional loss ψ in resources resulting from the security
risks faced by citizens in the economy, where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1. Let χc = 1−
∑N
i χi, be the fraction of
GDP devoted to consumption. Denote the utility in the ideal situation where none of the risks
materialize by uc = u(χc).
The probability density function (pdf) of realized threats, conditioned on risk mitigating ex-
penditures, is p(ψ|χ)—a probability distribution unknown to policy makers. The best available
estimate of p(ψ|χ) is denoted p˜(ψ|χ) but it is incontrovertible that p˜(ψ|χ) is highly unreliable.
We assume that the probability that a representative agent will suffer a loss in his welfare from
an attack is Pw. The value of Pw is highly uncertain and its best estimate, P˜w, depends on both
the level and distribution of defense expenditures.
Let R(χ|p, Pw) be the expected utility resulting from defense expenditure χ, when the prob-
ability of the threat being realized is Pw, and the pdf of the damage ψ is p(ψ|χ):
R(χ|p, Pw) =
(∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ)χc] p(ψ|χ) dψ
)
Pw + (1− Pw)uc (1)
Higher expected utility is preferable over lower expected utility, but Rc is the lowest acceptable
level of expected utility. It is a reward aspiration or a ‘reservation reward’.
The info-gap model is a family of nested sets of probability models p(ψ|χ) and Pw(χ),
indexed by α, which represents the degree of uncertainty in the policy maker’s best estimate of
the chances of any damage occurring and the conditional distribution of its level. We denote
this info-gap model by F [α, p˜(ψ|χ), P˜w(χ)], where α ≥ 0.
Info-gap models obey two axioms:
(i) Nesting asserts that the range of possible pdfs increases as α increases:
α < α′ =⇒ F [α, p˜, P˜w] ⊂ F [α
′, p˜, P˜w] (2)
(ii) Contraction asserts that when α = 0, the estimated models are the only possibilities:
F [0, p˜, P˜w] =
{
p˜, P˜w
}
(3)
These two axioms endow α with its meaning of a horizon of uncertainty.
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Let µ(χ, α) be the lowest expected reward, given defense expenditures χ, over an info-gap
model α around p˜ and P˜w. That is:
µ(α, χ) = min
(p,PW)∈F(α,p˜,P˜w)
R(χ|p, Pw) (4)
The value α̂(χ,Rc) is the robustness (to uncertainty in p˜ and P˜w) of security expenditures χ
with reward-aspiration Rc. It is the greatest range of Knightian uncertainty, α, up to which all
probability models in F result in reward no less than Rc, given expenditure χ:
α̂(χ,Rc) = max {α : µ(α, χ) ≥ Rc} (5)
The robustness function displays a fundamental trade-off between reward and robustness to
uncertainty: robustness decreases as the aspired reward increases (Ben-Haim, 2006):
Rc > R
′
c =⇒ α̂(χ,Rc) ≤ α̂(χ,R
′
c) (6)
Furthermore, if the aspiration is for the greatest reward expected with the estimated distribution,
then the robustness is zero (Ben-Haim, 2005):
χ∗ = arg max
χ
R(χ|p˜, P˜w), Rc = R(χ
∗|p˜, P˜w) =⇒ α̂(χ
∗, Rc) = 0 (7)
This means that if the estimated models p˜(ψ|χ) and P˜w are used to choose an expected-utility-
maximizing allocation χ∗, then this aspiration has zero robustness to uncertainty in these models.
Since more robustness is preferable to less, at the same level of satisficed utility, the decision
maker may wish to choose χ to satisfice the utility and to maximize the robustness. This is an
info-gap robust-satisficing decision approach, which is formally defined:
χ̂(Rc) = arg max
χ
α̂(χ, Rc) (8)
In this paper the policy maker chooses the value of χ that maximizes the lowest possible value
of expected utility over a set of probabilities and distribution functions indexed by α around the
best estimates. For any desired level of robustness α, the decision maker will choose χ to maxi-
mize µ(α, χ) as defined in (4). Note that for any aspiration level Rc, µ[χ̂(Rc), α̂(χ̂(Rc), Rc)] ≡ Rc.
3 An Illustration with Two Types of Security
Expenditure
3.1 Background
How do we quantify security threats and the losses they may generate, and what are the different
possible security expenditures that are meant to counter them? Consider first a threat from
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Total Direct People Fatalities
Costs Mobilized
Conflict Millions Percent Percent Percent
of 2002$ of GDP Thousands of Pop. Numbers of Pop.
Revolutionary War
(1775 – 1783) 2.2 63% 200 5.70% 4,435 0.127%
War of 1812
(1812 – 1815) 1.1 13% 286 3.80% 2,260 0.030%
Mexican War
(1846 – 1848) 1.6 3% 79 0.40% 1,733 0.008%
Civil War
(1861 – 1865) 62 104% 3,868 11.10% 184,594 0.538%
Span. Amer. War
(1898) 9.6 3% 307 0.40% 385 0.001%
World War I
(1917 – 1918) 190.6 24% 4,744 4.60% 53,513 0.052%
World War II
(1941 – 1945) 2,896.3 130% 16,354 12.20% 292,131 0.219%
Korea
(1950 – 1953) 335.9 15% 5,764 3.80% 33,651 0.022%
Vietnam
(1964 – 1972) 494.3 12% 8,744 4.30% 47,369 0.023%
First Gulf War
(1990 – 1991) 76.1 1% 2,750 1.10% 148 0.000%
Table 1: American Costs and Casualties from Major Wars. Source: William D. Nordhaus, “The
Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq” in War with Iraq, ed. Kaysen, et. al.
a conventional adversary. Table 1 presents the direct expenses of major U.S. wars along with
U.S. fatalities. In proportion to the size of the economy, the heaviest direct economic costs
were incurred during World War II; however, in terms of loss of life relative to the size of the
population, the Civil War was far deadlier. Obviously the latter conflict, fought entirely on
American soil, generated the greatest loss of capital, damage to infrastructure and disruption of
output. In the aftermath of World War I, Bogart (1919) began developing the tools to measure,
compare, and aggregate all these different costs of war, by including not only the direct costs in
military expenditure as well as physical destruction, but the indirect costs associated with the
capitalized values of losses in life and lost production. According to his calculations, the share
of direct costs incurred by all the combatants of World War I amounted to only 55% of the total
losses the war generated.
Broadberry and Howlett (1998) calculate that the UK spent approximately half of its GDP
fighting World War II during the years 1940 to 1944. In addition it suffered losses of physical
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capital that amounted to 89% of GDP in 1938 (see Mitchell 1980), and human capital losses
(calculated conservatively in terms of just the schooling invested in those killed) of 2.5% of
GDP in 1938. By any measure Soviet losses were far higher. During 1942 and 1943 defense
expenditures in the Soviet Union reached 61% of GDP, losses of physical capital amounted to
223% of pre-war GDP and losses of human capital were 109% (Harrison (1998)). Of course
these figures do not include the extraordinary privations suffered by those living under German
occupation during much of this period. To study the cost of World War II for the United States,
Rockoff (1998) employs a counterfactual approach developed by Goldin and Lewis (1975) to
study the Civil War. According to his estimates the total present value of foregone consumption
that can be attributed to both direct and indirect losses generated by the war equals 2.27 years
of consumption in 1941.
As most of its effects are indirect, the impact of terror is not as well understood. Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) estimate that terrorism in the Basque country of Northern Spain has reduced
GDP by 10%. Similarly, recent estimates of the loss in GDP that can be attributed to three
years of recurring terrorism against Israel is also approximately 10% (Eckstein and Tsiddon
(2004) and Persitz (2005)). Bram, Orr and Rapaport (2002) estimate the total cost of one
incident, the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center in New York, including lost
lifetime earnings of those killed, to be between $33 billion and $36 billion. What is clear is that
large-scale conventional warfare is far more costly than any losses associated with terror—Hess
(2003) calculates that for countries that have experienced conflict between 1960-1992 (nearly all
of it civil war or terrorism in this period), the loss in welfare associated with these conflicts is
on average equivalent to a permanent 8% drop in their consumption.
Fragmentary anecdotal and quantitative evidence exists concerning the impact of military
expenditures on the probability distribution of war-related damage. Rohlfs (2005) estimates
that the marginal effectiveness of a U.S. tank in Western Europe for 164 battles during World
War II, was twenty-four times the effectiveness of a single infantryman but eighty-seven times
as expensive to use. The discrepancy is explained by the higher casualties associated with
intensive use of infantry, implying that the U.S. government assigned a value of approximately
one million dollars (in 2003 dollars) to each soldier’s life saved on the battlefield. Although
Rohlfs’ study involves calculating ex-post a relatively simple trade-off in a single theater of a
war in its fifth and sixth year (1944-1945), his estimates contain relatively large standard errors
and vary across different sub-samples. By contrast, policy makers must determine ex-ante both
the overall effectiveness of defense expenditures and their optimal allocations, at a stage when
the nature, scale, and even eventuality of a conflict may be only hypothetical. In the years
prior to being attacked in 1941, the U.S.S.R. engaged in a massive rearmament program that,
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according to Bergson (1961), lowered per-capita consumption between 1937 and 1940 by as much
as 8.4%. However, not only did rearmament fail to deter Hitler’s invasion as the Soviets had
hoped, but because of serious military miscalculations, much of the arms and manpower was
squandered during the summer and fall of 1941 without seriously slowing the German advance
(Harrison (1985)).
3.2 Basic Structure
Consider an economy in which resources are allocated between civilian consumption and two
different types of security-related public expenditure. We divide security related public expen-
ditures into two broad categories, denoted χ1 and χ2. Both χ1 and χ2 are measured as shares of
GDP, and we ignore the possibility of international borrowing. We define a probability density
function (pdf) p(ψ|χ) as the damage the nation sustains in terms of lost GDP in the event
that it is attacked, and assume its shape is influenced by both the overall amount of resources
devoted to security, χ1 + χ2, and also by how resources are divided between χ1 and χ2.
All military expenditures fall into one of two broad categories. First, there are the devel-
opment and maintenance of large military formations, composed of large numbers of troops
receiving traditional military training to serve as infantrymen or to operate armor, artillery,
battleships and bombers. We denote this, the more traditional type of military expenditure,
and the one most closely associated with twentieth century warfare, as χ1. The second, type
of expenditure incorporates recent innovations in military technology and tactics, based on the
intensive use of information technology (IT) intelligence, high precision weaponry, and command
and control systems. This type of expenditure, which we denote χ2, is associated with the term
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA).
The possible damages from war is represented by the probability density function over the
possible fraction of output destroyed during an armed conflict, up to a maximum conceivable
fraction z. However, given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the conflict, we assume
that policy makers do not know the true pdf of damage. Policy makers’ best (but highly
uncertain) estimate of the damage pdf, conditional on being attacked, and the chosen allocation
of defense expenditure χ1 and χ2 are denoted by p˜(ψ|χ1, χ2). Given the long planning horizon
necessary to prepare for armed conflict, the relevant unit of time in this model is a decade.
The functional form for the best estimate of the damage density function reflects all available
knowledge about possible damages from threats to national security, and how these risks are
affected by both types of security expenditures. In the appendix we provide the specification
of the probability density function that is used in our illustration. It suffices here to note the
two most salient features implied by our specification, which capture the essence of the tradeoff
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Figure 1: The best estimate of the probability density of damage, conditional on defense
expenditure p˜(ψ|χ) as in (20), for different values of χ1 where total defense expenditure is
χ1 + χ2 = .1, and the maximum possible damage (as a share of GDP) is z = 1/2.
assumed to exist between the two alternative types of defense expenditure:
1. Mean damage generally declines as total security expenditures increase. That is, we expect
behavior along the lines of:
∂E(ψ)
∂(χ1 + χ2)
< 0 (9)
2. Mean damage and extreme damage respond in opposite directions to increases in RMA-
type expenditure, holding total security expenditure fixed. That is, we expect to generally
observe: (
∂E(ψ)
∂χ2
∣∣∣∣
χ1+χ2
)
×
(
∂Prob(ψ > 0.4z)
∂χ2
∣∣∣∣
χ1+χ2
)
< 0 (10)
In Figure 1 we graphically present the density function p˜(ψ|χ), based on the specification in
the appendix, where the maximum damage z = 1/2, holding total defense expenditures χ1 + χ2
constant at ten percent of GDP, and varying the value of the traditional military expenditure
χ1 between the values 0 and 0.1.
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Figure 2: The best estimate of the probability of being attacked P˜w(χ) as in (24), for
different values of χ1 and χ2, where z = 1/2.
The probability of suffering an attack over the course of a decade is also subject to uncer-
tainty, and is also a function of the overall size as well as distribution of defense expenditures.
We denote the probability of attack by Pw(χ) and the best (but highly uncertain) estimate of
this function is P˜w(χ).
3 The salient feature, which we illustrate in Figure 2, is that P˜w(χ) is a
decreasing function of both types of expenditure.
3.3 Info-Gap Model of Uncertainty
The density function p˜(ψ|χ) is the best estimate of the pdf of damage of an attack, given security
allocations χ.4 However, this estimate is based on fragmentary and unreliable evidence, and
hence contains potentially serious but unidentifiable errors. The same is true for the estimated
probability of attack, P˜w(χ). The true values deviate from these estimates by unknown amounts.
We use a fractional error info-gap model to represent the info-gaps in both the pdf of the
3See (24) in the appendix for precise function used in this example.
4See (20) in the appendix for precise function used in this example.
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damage and the probability of attack (Ben-Haim, 2006). Let P denote the set of all pdfs on
[0, 1]. Our info-gap model is the unbounded family of sets of pdfs p(ψ) and probabilities Pw:
F(α, p˜, P˜w) =
{
p(ψ), Pw : p(ψ) ∈ P, |p(ψ)− p˜(ψ|χ)| ≤ αp˜(ψ|χ), for all ψ
0 ≤ Pw ≤ 1, |Pw − P˜w(χ)| ≤ αP˜w(χ)
}
, α ≥ 0 (11)
The family of sets F(α, p˜, P˜w) contains every pdf p(ψ) that deviates proportionally from the
estimated density p˜(ψ|χ), at any level of damage ψ, by no more than α, and also all the
probabilities of being attacked Pw which differ proportionally from the estimated value P˜w(χ),
also by no more than α. The value of the fractional error α is unknown, so the info-gap model is
not a single set, but rather an unbounded family of nested sets of possible pdfs and probabilities.
Since α is unbounded, there is no worst case.
3.4 Robustness Function
The expected utility if an attack occurs, based on the estimated pdf of damage, is:
r˜(χ) =
∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ)χc] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (12)
Recall that the utility if an attack does not occur is uc, equal to u(χc). We assume that this is
greater than the estimated expected utility in the case of attack:
r˜(χ) < uc (13)
The total estimated expected utility, based on the estimated pdf of damage p˜(ψ|χ) and the
estimated probability of attack P˜w(χ), is:
R˜(χ) = P˜w(χ)r˜ + (1− P˜w(χ))uc (14)
The expected utility for arbitrary p(ψ|χ) and Pw is specified in (1), and the robustness
function is defined in (5). We derive the robustness function, based on the info-gap model (11)
and on the assumption (13), in the appendix, section 5.3. Suppressing the notational dependence
on χ, the robustness function is:
α̂(χ, Rc) =

(r˜ − uc − δr)P˜w +
√
(r˜ − uc − δr)2P˜ 2w + 4δrP˜w(R˜−Rc)
2δrP˜w
if R˜ ≥ Rc
0 else
(15)
where:
r˜1 =
∫ ψm
0
u [(1− ψ)χc] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (16)
r˜2 =
∫ 1
ψm
u [(1− ψ)χc] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (17)
δr = r˜1 − r˜2 (18)
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and ψm is the median of p˜(ψ|χ). Given that marginal utility is positive, r˜1 > r˜2, and therefore
δr > 0. This, together with (13), implies that r˜ − uc − δr < 0.
3.5 Numerical Results
We adopt the constant-risk-aversion specification for the utility function u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ),
where γ > 0. The best estimates of the pdf of damage is defined in (20)–(22) in the Appendix,
and the probability of suffering an attack is defined in (24). The value of R˜ in (14) is expressed
in terms of utility. In our economy the representative individual has a maximum of a single unit
of consumption, from which defense expenditures and any damage to the economy are deducted.
Rather than report our results in units of utility, we convert the values of R˜ in (14) into their
consumption equivalents.5
Figure 3 contains two examples corresponding to maximum potential damages z = 1/2 and
z = 1, for different values of χ1 and χ2 in the grid [0, 0.4]× [0, 0.4]. The frames are shown with
levels of robustness equal to 0, 1, 2 and 3, corresponding to immunity to 0, 100%, 200% and
300% error in the probability models. For the frame with robustness α̂ = n, each contour is
indexed by an Rc value, and consists of all defense expenditures (χ1, χ2) at which α̂(χ,Rc) = n.
Consider the four panels on the right-hand side of Figure 3 that correspond to the maximum
possible damage of 100%, z = 1—an attack has the potential to drive consumption all the way
to zero. Recall from (7) that a policy maker who wishes to maximize the expected utility must
accept zero robustness to model misspecification. Looking at the upper right-hand panel of
Figure 3, we find that if policy makers maximize expected utility under p˜(ψ|χ) and P˜w(χ), the
greatest level at which the expected utility can be satisficed is obtained if they choose to devote
7.4% of GDP to defense, allocating 2.7% to traditional military expenditures, χ1, and 4.7%
to expenditures on RMA, χ2. As illustrated in Table 2, under expected utility maximization
the policymakers are willing to tolerate a high probability of being attacked over the course
of a decade (P˜w(χ)=0.517), a relatively high level of expected damage if the attack occurs
(E(ψ | χ)=0.355), and a fairly large probability of suffering losses of over 40% of GDP, again
if the attack occurs (Pr{ψ ≥ 0.4z}=0.392). On the other hand, if policymakers are unsure of
the reliability of their probabilistic estimates and require a robustness level of 100% (α̂ = 1),
the amount of GDP devoted to defense increases to 28.8% of consumption, with 18.8% of
GDP devoted to traditional military expenditures, and 10% devoted to RMA. The probability
of suffering an attack, the expected damage the country will sustain if an attack does occur,
and the probability that any losses will exceed 40% of GDP all drop at these higher levels of
expenditure.
5In our calculations we set γ = .98, so utility is close to logarithmic.
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Figure 3: Contour plots for the value of R˜ for different values of α̂ and z.
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Figure 4: Three Dimensional plots for the value of R˜ for different values of α̂ and z. The
value of q = cE − 1.
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χ1 χ2 P˜W E(ψ | χ) Pr{ψ ≥ .4z} cE
z = 1/2
α̂ = 0 0 0.015 0.671 0.172 0.378 0.861
α̂ = 1 0.047 0.051 0.480 0.180 0.397 0.670
α̂ = 2 0.125 0.061 0.382 0.176 0.373 0.558
α̂ = 3 0.188 0.075 0.318 0.166 0.329 0.482
z = 1
α̂ = 0 0.027 0.047 0.517 0.355 0.392 0.710
α̂ = 1 0.188 0.100 0.299 0.305 0.289 0.486
α̂ = 2 0.287 0.121 0.223 0.267 0.215 0.383
α̂ = 3 0.349 0.132 0.185 0.244 0.175 0.328
Table 2: Values of χ1, χ2, P˜W , E(ψ | χ), Pr{ψ ≥ .4z} and cE at the highest levels at which
expected utility can be satisficed with robustness equal to 0, 1, 2 and 3, and z=1/2 and 1.
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A comparison of the two different levels of defense expenditures and their allocations demon-
strates that if a policy maker is interested in achieving some level of robustness against the un-
reliability of the probabilistic estimates for both damage and attack, he will opt to substantially
raise the total amount of resources devoted to security. Furthermore, rather than increasing
the allocations to each by either the same amount or the same proportions, he will choose an
allocation skewed in favor of the more traditional type of expenditure, χ1. The higher the re-
quired robustness, the more pronounced this property becomes. If required robustness increases
to 200%, the total amount of defense expenditure is 40.8% of GDP, with 28.7% of GDP al-
loted to traditional military expenditures, χ1, and 12.1% to RMA, χ2. To achieve robustness at
the 300% level, the policy maker must spend 48.1% on defense, devoting 34.9% to traditional
armaments, and 13.2% to RMA-type expenditures.
One implication of the above example is that even achieving 100% robustness requires de-
voting a large fraction of the economy’s resources to defense. However, this is the case when
the parameter z, which determines the maximum amount of possible damage, is set to one, and
there is some positive probability of complete annihilation.
Suppose instead we set z = 1/2, so that the greatest possible loss, in the event of war, will not
exceed half of GDP; policy makers maximize expected utility by apportioning a meager 1.5% of
GDP to defense, all of which is devoted to RMA-type expenditures. If policy makers choose to
forgo robustness, they will completely abandon spending on the traditional military. If instead
they demand robustness at a level of 100%, they will choose an allocation between traditional
and RMA-type expenditures of 4.7% and 5.1% respectively. At a robustness level of 200%, the
total expenditure rises to 18.6% and traditional expenditures, χ1, more than double to 12.5%.
At 300% robustness, total expenditure is 26.3%, more than two-thirds of which (18.8% of GDP)
is spent on the traditional military.
In the last column of Table 2, we present the values of cE , which represent the different levels
of welfare, in terms of expected utility from consumption, associated with different combinations
of robustness, (αˆ) and defense expenditures, (χ1 and χ2). This measure is calculated as follows.
First, we define RE(n) as the greatest value at which the expected utility can be satisficed, with
robustness equal to n:
RE(n) = max
χ
{Rc : α̂(χ,Rc) = n} (19)
The value of cE is the consumption-equivalent to RE(n), defined through the utility function
as: RE(n) = u(cE). The contours in Figure 3, and the levels in its three dimensional counterpart
Figure 4, represent the value of q = cE − 1, the deviation in welfare (calculated in terms of
equivalent consumption) from the utopian outcome associated with neither war nor any spending
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on defense. The highest points in Figure 4 are attained by the values of χ1 and χ2 in Table 2.
The values of cE in Table 2 demonstrate that achieving robustness entails some cost. For
example, suppose the maximum level of damage equals 1/2, and the policy maker is willing
to put his complete trust in the estimated damage probability distribution and the probability
of war, α = 0. Again, the policy maker devotes only 1.5% of GDP to defense, all alloted to
RMA-type expenditures, and this generates a value of cE=.861. Hence, the combined loss in
welfare associated with the defense expenditure, and the random effects of these expenditures
on the probability of war and its accompanying expected damage, are worth 14% of GDP. If
on the other hand, the policy maker has less faith in the reliability of the information used
to generate the probability distributions, insulating himself against deviations of up to 100%
from both the estimated distributions necessitates raising overall defense spending to 9.8% of
GDP, nearly equally divided between traditional and RMA-type expenditures. Achieving this
level of robustness lowers the value of cE to 0.67—pursuing a policy that is robust to model
misspecification at the 100% level requires sacrificing an additional 19% of GDP, when compared
to the defense allocation associated with zero robustness.
Achieving yet higher levels of robustness will entail even greater sacrifices however, the
relationship is not linear but rather concave, so that raising robustness to 200% yields a cE of
0.558—an incremental loss in welfare of 11.2% of GDP. Raising robustness still further, to 300%,
lowers the value of cE to 0.482, an incremental loss in welfare of only 7.6% of GDP.
4 Conclusion
Our application of the information gap approach to the problem of allocating resources for
national security yields three broad conclusions, each of which is evaluated quantitatively. First,
the higher the robustness to model misspecification policy makers demand, the higher the overall
level of defense expenditures required. Second, the greater the demand for robustness, the
greater should be the reliance on those defense measures better suited to prevent extremely
high levels of damage. Similarly, the more robustness policy makers wish to achieve, the more
they should eschew investment in systems that promise the best expected outcomes on the
battlefield, but are also more vulnerable to catastrophical damage.
Beyond the normative recommendations for how policy makers can best allocate resources
to protect their countries from aggression, in a world in which much of the relevant information
is unreliable, the model also provides some positive insights into the reasons for the policies
policy makers choose today or have chosen in the past. In a world with unreliable probabilistic
information, we should not be surprised if policy makers lavish higher expenditure on defense
than would be appropriate if the only goal were expected utility maximization. Furthermore, we
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would expect policy makers to favor expenditures on weapons systems, and associated tactics
and strategies, that are both most effective in preventing worst-case scenarios and are also
better understood. These would suggest one possible rationale for military planners’ reputation
for conservatism, and indeed inertia, when confronted with new and untried technologies and
doctrines.
5 Appendix
5.1 Specification of the Best Estimate of Damage, Conditional on Being At-
tacked
The best estimate of damage, conditional on being attacked is:
p˜(ψ|χ) =
ψa(χ)−1(z − ψ)b(χ)−1z1−a(χ)−b(χ)Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
I(z−ψ) (20)
where the Γ function is given by Γ(x) =
∫
∞
0 t
(x−1)e−tdt, I(z−ψ) is the indicator function and:
a(χ) = 1 + χ1χ2 + θe
θχ1 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ1 (21)
b(χ) = 2 + χ1χ2 + e
χ2 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ2 (22)
The mean of this pdf is:
E(ψ|χ) = z
Γ(1 + a(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(1 + a(χ) + b(χ))
(23)
We set the value of θ = 3 in our calculations.
5.2 Specification of the Best Estimate of the Probability of Being Attacked
The best estimate of the probability of being attacked is:
P˜w(χ) = 1−
(
β 1
2
(a(χ), b(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))(χ1 + χ2)
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
) 1
4
(24)
where βx(a, b) ≡
∫ x
0 t
a−1(1− t)b−1dt and a(χ) and b(χ) are defined in (21) and (22).
The term χ1 +χ2 is the total military expenditure, and reflects its deterrent value. The term
[β1/2(a, b)Γ(a + b)]/[Γ(a)Γ(b)] is the probability of an enemy attack successfully inflicting at most
half of the maximal potential damage. The higher this number is, the lower the likelihood that
an adversary will be tempted to launch an attack.
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5.3 Derivation of the Robustness Function
We derive the robustness function in (15) based on assumption (13) and for values of the
robustness not in excess of unity: α̂ ≤ 1. We make no assumptions about the utility function
u(c) other than that the marginal utility is positive: u˙(c) > 0.
The robustness is defined in (5). The main task is to find the pdf of the damage, p(ψ|χ)
which, at horizon of uncertainty α, minimizes the expected utility R(χ|p, Pw) defined in (1).
Because the marginal utility is positive it is evident that R(χ|p, Pw) is minimized by that pdf
in U(α, p˜, P˜w) which assigns as much weight as possible at large levels of damage and as little
weight as possible at low levels of damage. For the fractional-error info-gap model in (11) one
readily shows that min
α
R(χ|p, Pw) occurs with the following pdf:
p(ψ|χ) =
 (1− α)p˜(ψ|χ) if ψ ≤ ψm(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (25)
where ψm is the median of the estimated pdf p˜(ψ|χ) and where α ≤ 1.
If α > 1 then min
α
R(χ|p, Pw) occurs with the following pdf:
p(ψ|χ) =
 0 if ψ ≤ ψs(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (26)
where ψs satisfies:
(1 + α)
∫ 1
ψs
p˜(ψ|χ) dψ = 1 (27)
In other words, ψs is the 1− 1/(1 + α) quantile of p˜(ψ|χ).
We will consider only the case α ≤ 1. The derivation of robustness in excess of unity is
analogous.
The utility R(χ|pPw) in (1), evaluated with the pdf in (25), is:
R(χ|pPw) = [r˜ − δrα− uc] Pw + uc (28)
where r˜ and δr are defined in (12) and (18) and uc is the utility if an attack does not occur,
u(χc). The term r˜−δrα−uc is negative so the minimizing value of Pw in U(α, p˜, P˜w) is (1+α)P˜w.
Thus the minimum expected utility, up to horizon of uncertainty α, is:
min
p,PW∈U(α,p˜,P˜w)
R(χ|p, Pw) = [r˜ − δrα− uc] (1 + α)P˜w + uc (29)
Denote this minimum µ(α), which decreases monotonically as α increases because δr > 0. The
robustness is, according to the definition in (5), the greatest value of α up to which µ(α) is no
less than Rc. That is, the robustness is the lowest non-negative solution for α̂ of:
µ(α̂) = Rc (30)
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This is a quadratic equation in α whose least non-negative root is (15).
The derivation of the robustness function in (30) is obtained by equating (28) to Rc and
solving for α, with P˜w(χ) instead of Pw.
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